Articles

[20] “Prior Interaction, Identity, and Cooperation in the Inter-Group Prisoner’s Dilemma,” joint with Timothy N. Cason and Sau-Him Paul Lau, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 166: 613-629, 2019.

• Success in a six-person inter-group coordination game increases cooperation in a subsequent one-shot inter-group prisoner’s dilemma played by two three-person teams.  Read abstract.

[19] “Individual versus Group Choices of Repeated Game Strategies: A Strategy Method Approach,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, Games and Economic Behavior, 114, 128-145, 2019.

• Groups are more forgiving than individuals in an indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner’s dilemma, but otherwise behave similarly to individuals. Read abstract.

[18] “The Prince – or Better No Prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor,” joint with Kai A. Konrad, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61: 2158-2182, 2017.

• Derives conditions under which a rent-maximizing self-interested leader will appoint a successor despite the threat posed by the successor.  Read abstract.

[17] “Individual versus Group Play in the Repeated Coordinated Resistance Game,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2: 94–106, 2015, (JEPS is the new official journal of the Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association launched in 2014).

• Groups behave similarly to individuals in a finitely repeated divide-and-conquer social dilemma (the Coordinated Resistance game). Read abstract.

 [16] “Rich Communication, Social Motivations, and Coordinated Resistance against Divide-and Conquer: A Laboratory Investigation,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, European Journal of Political Economy, 37: 146-159, 2015.

• Successful joint resistance against divide-and-conquer increases almost four-fold when moving from restrictive communication to Rich Communication. Read abstract.

 [15] “Coordinating Resistance through Communication and Repeated Interaction,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, The Economic Journal, 124: F226-F256, 2014.

• Repetition alone is far from sufficient in deterring leader expropriation in the Coordinated Resistance game. Adding communication reduces expropriation even with repetition. Read abstract.

 [14] “Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game,” joint with Timothy N. Cason and Sau-Him Paul Lau, Economic Theory, 54: 335-357, 2013.

• Individuals with turn-taking experience are more likely to incur the cost to teach others turn-taking behavior than inexperienced individuals. Read abstract.

[13] “Using Turn Taking to Achieve Intertemporal Cooperation and Symmetry in Infinitely Repeated 2×2 Games,” joint with Sau-Him Paul Lau, Theory and Decision, 72: 167-188, 2012.

• Presents a repeated game model to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games. Read abstract.

[12] “Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Coordination and Conflict Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game,” joint with Sau-Him Paul Lau, Theory and Decision, 65: 153-183, 2008.

• Turn-taking can by supported by a “turn taking with independent randomizations” strategy in the repeated Battle of Sex game. Read abstract.  

[11] “Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, Experimental Economics, 10: 251-267, 2007.

• Read abstract.

[10] “Rules of Engagement, Credibility and the Political Economy of Organizational Dissent,” joint with Nicholas Argyres, Strategic Organization, 5: 107-154 (lead article), May, 2007.

• Presents a model to study the challenges faced by organizations when trying to adopt rules of engagement aimed at capturing the informational benefits of dissent while minimizing opportunistic “destructive dissent.” Read abstract.

[9] “Uncertainty and Resistance to Reform in Laboratory Participation Games,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, European Journal of Political Economy, 21: 708-737, 2005.

• Individual-specific uncertainty reduces the incidence of reform even with costly political participation by supporters and opponents of reform. Read abstract.

[8] “Testing Political Economy Models of Reform in the Laboratory,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 93: 208-212, May, 2003.

• Discusses the promises and challenges of using the laboratory to study the political economy of reform.

[7] “Fairness and Sharing in Innovation Games: A Laboratory Investigation,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48: 243-264,July, 2002.

• Experimental evidence that envy can prevent agents from adopting potentially Pareto improving innovations. Read abstract.

[6] “Information, Civil Liberties, and the Political Economy of Witch-hunts,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15: 503-525, July 1999.

• Stronger civil liberties protection reduces the leader’s ability to manipulate his informational advantage in social purges, but no amount of civil liberty protection can eliminate “illegitimate witch-hunts.” Read abstract.

[5] “Contracting in the Shadow of a Corrupt Court,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 155: 249-283 (lead article), June, 1999.

• Uses an incomplete contracting model to study how judicial corruption and judicial favoritism distort contracting parties’ incentives to invest and choices of governance structures. Read abstract.

[4] “Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42: 248-265, June/September, 1998.

• In the sequential dictator game, Socially Relevant Information and Irrelevant Information have different impacts on dictators’ allocation decisions. Self-regarding subjects are less susceptible to social influence. Read abstract.

[3] “A Laboratory Study of Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game,” joint with Timothy N. Cason, The Economic Journal, 107: 1465-1483, September, 1997.          

• In the team dictator game, overall, team and individual decisions do not differ, however, team choices tend to be dominated by the more other‐regarding member when members’ individual decisions are in conflict. The data are more consistent with Social Comparison Theory than Persuasive Argument Theory. Read abstract.

[2] “The Economics of Envy,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26: 311-336 (lead article), May, 1995.

• Analyzes how agents’ innovating, retaliating, sabotaging, and sharing behaviour are jointly determined by legal institutions and agents’ propensities for envy. Read abstract.

[1] “Economic Growth and Generalized Depreciation,” joint with Steven M. Goldman and Tosio Kato, Journal of Development Economics, 34 (1991): 397-400, November 1990.

• The main conclusions of the seminal Solow growth model are robust to virtually all patterns of capital depreciation. Read abstract.

Book Reviews

[2] Review of Social Norms, edited by Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp, Journal of Economic Literature, 40: 927-928, September, 2002.

[1] Review of Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Network, Contract Law, and Gift Exchange by Janet Landa, Public Choice, 88: 203-209, July, 1996.